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THE UNION OF LATMOS AND PIDASA RECONSIDERED


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To say that the fairly recent discovery of an inscription detailing the union of two Karian cities, Latmos and Pidasa, received the attention it deserved would be an understatement. The late fourth century document was quickly and skillfully published by Wolfgang Blümel in 1997, and its importance for our understanding of the local political history of Karia heralded by the careful if select treatments of Christian Habicht and C. P. Jones.1 This was followed in 2003 by another flurry of studies: a comprehensive and detailed republication by Michael Wörrle, a chapter in Alice Bencivenni’s book on constitutional reform, and Riet van Bremen’s analysis of the clause regulating marriage.2 Not much later, Gary Reger included the text in his treatment of sympoliteia in Asia Minor.3 Finally, in 2007, Sara Saba offered an interesting interpretation of the housing clauses in the agreement.4 Remarkably, there was very little controversy among all these scholars about the aims and significance of the inscription.5 According to the general consensus, Latmos absorbed its neighbor Pidasa by order of the Hellenistic satrap Asandros, whose role was honored through the name of the newly created tribe Asandris. Moreover, the terms of the agreement indicate a clear intent to eradicate any sense of Pidasean identity: the Pidaseans were forced to move to Latmos and intermarry with their new fellow-citizens, preventing “any lingering sense ... of continuing self-identity”.6 It was only due to the eventual and perhaps quickly ensuing failure of the merger that Pidasa retained its identity and autonomy until at least the early second century, when it entered into a more lasting sympoliteia with Miletos.7

It is precisely this picture that I wish to re-examine here. I contend that the accepted conclusions about the causes for the sympoliteia rely more on assumptions than evidence from the text itself. These assumptions are in turn based on the tendency in Hellenistic scholarship to view politics from the top down. The more familiar narratives of the ambitions of the diadochoi (and later, the Hellenistic monarchs) are used to explain the obscure and the remote, often at the expense of the primary evidence. But rather than revealing a world of weak and ineffective cities whose very political organization could be altered at the whim of a satrap, the agreement between Latmos and Pidasa demonstrates the very active role that local communities took in negotiating

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1 I would like to sincerely thank Professor Blümel, the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism, and the Milas Archaeological Museum for allowing me the opportunity to study first hand the inscription that made this article possible.

2 Blümel (1997); Blümel (1998); Habicht (1998); Jones (1999). The text of the inscription is also published in full in SEG 47.1563. Both Habicht and Jones focused their analysis on a passage of the text dealing with the allotment of members in a new tribe from members of pre-existent tribes and phratries, an issue that I will not take up here.


6 Two notable exceptions are the interpretation of the clause dealing with tribes and phratries (see n. 1 above) and Bencivenni’s unique translation of σταθμοί as a unit of grain. In the latter case, I can add little to the comments of Saba (p. 125f.), as Bencivenni does not address the orthodox translation (“lodging”).

7 Reger (2004), 151.

8 Dated to around 188/187 BC (see Errington 1989, 287f.). Pidasean identity very likely survived even this absorption, at least for a time, due to the preservation of local sanctuaries and the city itself, on which see Gauthier (2001).
the new realities and ever-evolving power structures created by Alexander’s whirlwind conquest and demise. In this light, political union can be seen as a response to forces that made the combination of resources a desirable alternative to separate autonomy. At the same time, we should also be wary of assuming a top-down approach even at a local perspective. To view the absorption of Pidasa as a purely one-way process of Latmian expansion is to misconstrue the intent behind the clauses of the agreement; once understood, these clauses can be seen to preserve the identities of both communities while at the same time promoting harmony and cooperation between them.

The inference that the Karian satrap Asandros ordered the merger of Latmos and Pidasa comes from the first surviving clause of the agreement (the stone is broken off at the top):

“… that the office-holders now lead forth a sacrifice so that the city be of one mind; and to arrange in addition to the existing tribes a new one and to name it Asandris; and to allot [sc. members] in it from all the tribes and phratries that exist in Latmos and in Pidasa” (ll. 4–8).

This sole allusion has led the above-mentioned scholars to adduce the satrap as the primary cause of the combination. This view is bolstered by a reading of certain clauses (see below) that sees them as both constraining and inconvenient for both cities. These clauses only make sense, they argue, if they were imposed by an external authority; no city would ever force its citizens to only marry members of another community, nor would Latmos, as the larger party to the agreement, willingly offer lodging to the Pidaseans for a year. Instead, motives for the arrangement are to be sought in Asandros’ desire to usurp ancient particularisms, to secure access between his residence in Mylasa and the important harbor of Miletos, and to advertise his name through the new tribe. The evidence behind this reconstruction, however, does not suggest the active influence of Asandros; rather, the choice to name the new tribe Asandris looks like a gesture from dependent but autonomous communities (now one city). The naming of a tribe after a satrap (or dynast) is only unique in history, as Bencivenni claims, if we assume that Asandros named the new tribe himself. This assumption, however, seems unwarranted. To name a tribe after oneself would seem to share the same aims as the numerous (re)foundations of cities bearing feminized forms of royal onomastics (Alexandreia, Antigoneia, etc.), yet how would the tribe Asandris advertise Asandros’ power to anyone outside Latmos-Pidasa or even emphasize the satrap’s authority to anyone outside this community? Few Greeks beyond the confines of these cities would take any interest in, or have any chance to become familiar with, the names of Latmian tribes. Moreover, in giving his name to only one tribe, Asandros would have been leaving three-fourths of the civic population to distinguish themselves from his self-titled tribe (if there were three tribes prior to the sympoliteia). It is hard to fathom what such an act would have accomplished had it originated with Asandros.

On the other hand, if the new tribe’s name was the seed of one or both of the merging cities, not only can we make more sense of the clause, but we can find a historical parallel in support...
of our supposition, namely the two tribes named after Antigonos and his son Demetrios by the Athenians not many years after our text was inscribed (and later the thirteenth tribe in honor of Ptolemy). These examples did not involve constitutional interference in the constitution of Athens, but the expression of gratitude toward the king and his son for freeing the city from its Macedonian garrison. If calling the new tribe Asandris should also be understood as an act of gratitude, then this only proves that Asandros did something worthy of such a gesture, and makes extremely improbable that this beneficence came in the form of an unwanted imposition from above. The true reason for this gratitude remains unspoken, but presumably this would have been expressed (or recorded) elsewhere, as our inscription dealt with other matters that had little to do with the satrap. If, on the other hand, the two cities were thanking the satrap specifically for enacting the merger, it is strange that his name shows up nowhere else in the inscription. Oddly enough, this fact has not troubled those who see Asandros behind the sympolliteia. They either ignore his absence in the text— the implication perhaps being that real power needed to be couched in appearances acceptable to the poleis involved— or imagine accompanying documents whose existence is completely unfounded. At the very least, this interpretation requires a historical parallel for one or two cities following the behest of a ruler with no evidence in the primary text of that behest. Lacking this, it is clear that such interpretations are driven by a top-down approach to Hellenistic history that favors reading “high political history” into all possible evidence.

In the case of Latmos and Pidasa, we have every reason to think that the figure of Asandros was invoked by the cities themselves, and in the specific context of the naming of the tribe alone. Contrasting our text with an actual mandated synoikismos, that of Teos and Lebedos under the direction of Antigonos, is illuminating. In this latter merger, Antigonos asserts himself strongly throughout the text of the arrangement, issuing a διάγραμμα and discussing terms in the first person. We find no mention, however, of Asandros himself in the sympolliteia between Latmos and Pidasa— the tribal name is an allusion; rather, the pact is the result of a ψήφισμα and δόγμα issued by Latmos and Pidasa (ll. 32–33), language that fully suggests that the decision rested with these two cities. It is likely that the two cities took the opportunity of the merger, arranged for other reasons, to foster good relations with their suzerain, and perhaps even to offer a token of gratitude for his approval of the accord. That these communities fell under the authority of Asandros is indubitable. In fact, the presence of Macedonian deities as the oath-gods could suggest that the satrap acted as the third-party guarantor between the two communities. Yet this does not compel us to assume a bureaucratic control of every event that occurred in Karia. As we

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13 For example, Wörrle (2003), 142 supposes that a gnomon from Asandros stipulated the merger. It is telling that no attempt has been made to suggest that Asandros’ role is mentioned in the missing part of the inscription.
14 For the distinction between high and low political history, see Ma (1999), 1–26.
15 A comparison of this case with the combination of Latmos and Pidasa, without acknowledging the amount of rather significant discrepancies, is crucial to the interpretation of Wörrle (2003), 142, Bencivenni (2003), 154 et passim, and Saba (2007), 128–132.
16 C. B. Welles, Royal Correspondence in the Hellenistic Period, 1934, 3–4.
17 Latmos and Pidasa swear to “abide by the decree” (ἐμμενεῖν ἐν τῶι ψηφίσματι) and “to record the decision on stone stelai” (τὸ δὲ δόγμα ἀναγράψαι εἰς στήλας λιθίνας).
18 The gods include Zeus, Gê, Helios, Poseidon, and Areian and Tauropolitan Athena, which closely parallels the oath-gods sworn by in the sympolliteia between Smyrna and the Macedonian military colony at Magnesia on the Sipylos (Inschriften von Magnesia am Sipylos 1). Cf. Wörrle (2003), 137f.
know from countless instances, royal authority and freedom of action at a local level were quite compatible in the Hellenistic World.\textsuperscript{19}

We would also do well to question the motives ascribed to Asandros for imposing the combination of Latmos and Pidasa. The notion that a \textit{sympoliteia} would secure a route for the satrap to Miletos seems self-contradictory. The satrap operated out of Mylasa, whose territory was separated from Miletos by the Euromos valley and the mountain pass leading to the Latmian Gulf, where Miletos controlled the harbor town of Ioniapolis. This meant that any route between the two cities could easily bypass Latmos, whose position on the eastern shore of the gulf oriented it southward to the Bafa plain but not to the foothills of Mount Grion.\textsuperscript{20} This land was controlled by Pidasa, who also possessed territory in the Euromos valley, which its dual \textit{acropoleis} overlooked.\textsuperscript{21} Thus, if Asandros did not have access to Miletos before the \textit{sympoliteia}, then the assumption is that he did not control Pidasa. If he did not control Pidasa, how could he mandate a \textit{sympoliteia}? If he controlled the city, how would combining it with the more remote Latmos gain access to Miletos, which authority over neighboring Pidasa would have already given him? At the same time, Gauthier’s notion that Asandros sought to break up ancient particularisms, accepted by Wörrle, depends on the unsubstantiated assumption that local communal ties were viewed as a threat by any Hellenistic ruler.\textsuperscript{22} More to the point, such an aim lacks precedent in the career of Asandros himself. Upon closer inspection, then, it appears that even if the satrap did influence the \textit{sympoliteia} between Latmos and Pidasa, the motives for the agreement are to be sought in the two cities involved.

If we consider the perspective of Latmos and Pidasa, at least as expressed in the text of the agreement, our attention is drawn to several clauses in particular:

- And to allot the rest of the Pidaseans in the existing tribes as equally as possible.
- That the Pidaseans receive a lot and have a share in all sacred rites, as phratry members in rites of the phratries, as tribesmen in rites of the tribes, which each man obtains by lot.
- That the Pidaseans’ income and that of the Latmians, both sacred and from all other sources, be common, and that nothing be particular to either city (ll. 8–17).
- That the Latmians provide sufficient dwellings (\textit{σταθμοὺς}) for the Pidaseans for one year.
- In order that they might intermarry, let it be forbidden for a Latmian to give his daughter to a Latmian or take a Latmian girl in marriage, nor for a Pidasean to act likewise with a Pidasean, but a Latmian is to give to and receive from a Pidasean and a Pidaseans likewise to and from a Latmian for six years.
- That the magistracies consist in common of Pidaseans and Latmians.
- That the Pidaseans be allowed to build houses in the public sector of the city wherever they wish (ll. 19–28).\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{19} See, e.g., Ma (1999), 106–242.
\textsuperscript{20} Robert (1978), 509–514, who argues that this plain is the only conceivable arable land close enough to support the city.
\textsuperscript{21} Cook (1961); cf. Radt (1973–74).
\textsuperscript{22} See n. 11.
\textsuperscript{23} 8–17: τοὺς δὲ λο[π]τοὺς Πιδασείων ἐπικληρότατο ἐπὶ τὰς ὑπαρχόντως φυλὰς ὡς ἱσότατον τοὺς δὲ λαχόντας Πιδασεῖς μετέχειν ἵπτων πάντων, τοὺς μὲν φράτορις τῶν φρατηρίων, τὰς δὲ φυλὰς τῶν φυλητρικῶν, οὐ ἀν ἕκαστοι λόγοις· τοὺς δὲ προσόδους [τῶν] ὑπαρχόντως Πιδασείων καὶ Λατμίων [τῶν] ἵπτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων εἶναι κοινάς, ἵδιον δὲ μηθὲν εἶναι μηδέτεραι τῶν πόλεων.

19–28: σταθμοὺς δὲ παρέχειν Πιδασείων ἰκανοὺς Λατμίως ἐνιαυτὸν· ἵπτας δὲ ἵπται ἐπὶ ἐπιτησίματα πιστῶς πρὸς ἄλληλους, μὴ ἔξεστοι Λάτμιοι Λατμίωι διδόναι θυγατέρας μηδὲ λαμβάνειν μηδὲ Πιδασεῖς ἀλλιώτους.
As I have mentioned, these clauses have seemed to most scholars to aim at the complete absorption of Pidasa as a separate community by Latmos: all Pidaseans not enrolled in the new tribe are to be assigned a Latmian tribe; neither city is to possess anything that does not belong to the other, including magistracies; the Latmians must house the Pidaseans; citizens of one city can only marry those from the other for six years. The remarkable clause on forced intermarriage, combined with the injunction to settle the Pidaseans in Latmos, leads Reger to conclude that “Pidasa as a polis would cease to exist by the terms of this agreement”. This would speak to the motives of Latmos in the agreement, at least, namely the desire to absorb a smaller neighbor who possessed fertile agricultural land and access to central Karia, in particular the capital Mylasa. According to this view, Latmos sought to expand territorially, economically, and perhaps commercially as well. On the other hand, perhaps Pidasa was simply getting the best deal out of an unavoidable situation: the equality of status within the community would have certainly been preferable to conquest or some other form of dependence.

Nonetheless, this speculative but plausible scenario fails upon closer inspection. For one thing, the inevitability of Pidasa’s absorption does not mesh well with its later departure from the sympoliteia. More importantly, the text itself allows Pidasa to maintain its identity more than has been argued previously. The stipulation that “nothing be particular to either city” shows that Pidasa was still considered a polis (conveying the physical sense of the word at least). It also appears to intend the effacement of communal possessions that belong to Pidasa (or Latmos) specifically. Yet a closer reading reveals that the phrase occurs in the specific context of both cities’ finances, and as such is simply a reiteration of what precedes it, i.e., the combination of both cities’ sacred and public income. Clarifying redundancy is certainly no stranger to Greek inscriptions, whereas it would be odd if, in a document outlining very specific aspects of the agreement, one clause generalized from prosodoi to all things public within each community. No mention is made of law courts, for example, or local administrative bodies (to be distinguished from individual posts). Pidaseans were also able to remain in their own phratries, and while this meant that the main subunit of their city now possessed an inferior status to the main subunit of the sympoliteia (the Latmian tribes), it also meant that whatever administrative and, most importantly, religious functions these bodies had would continue to persist as focal points for Pidasean identity. The inscription guarantees that the sacred rites of the phratries (both Pidasean and Latmian) would continue to be enjoyed under the new arrangement.

The provisions for housing in the agreement have also been taken by Reger to intend the physical eradication of the city of Pidasa. Saba develops this conclusion more fully in an attempt to show that the housing clauses are evidence for royal intervention and local unwillingness. She links the stathmoi offered to the Pidaseans with the compulsory quartering of soldiers in the homes of citizens (epistathmeia) and argues that permanent housing provisions – the permis-

υάλλα διδόναι καὶ λαμβάνειν Λάτμιον μὲν Πιδασαί, Πιδασεῖα δὲ Λατμίων ἐφ’ ἐπὶ ἔξ· τὸ δὲ [ἀβρ]χεία καταστάναι καὶ ἐκ Πιδασείων καὶ Λατμίων ἐξεῖναι δὲ Πιδασεύσιν οἰκοδομεῖσθαι ὑπηκώπης ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐν τῇ δημοσίᾳ ὕπατῳ ὑπὲρ οἰκίσκαιντας [β].

24 Reger (2004), 151.
25 See above and the second-century inscription detailing the sympoliteia between Miletos and Pidasa, in which Pidasean grape, olive, bee, and sheep farmers receive tax exemptions (Milet I.3, no. 149).
26 This is Wörle’s reading, (2003), 129f.
27 Habicht (1998), contra Reger (2004), who assumes that they were allotted into new phratries in addition to their new tribes.
sion for Pidaseans to build houses in the public sector – are unprecedented in voluntary sympoliteiai.28 Both of these points are problematic. The semantic connection between stathmoi and epistathmeia is unquestionable, but every instance of this latter practice post-dates our inscription by 40–100 years, and most come from a specifically Ptolemaic context.29 This should caution us from talking about the “common use” of stathmoi outside of Ptolemaic practice, which in most cases was enforced in the Egyptian khôra among non-Greeks or in newly founded cities with no tradition of autonomy.30 Moreover, not every offer of temporary lodging was enforced by an outside power. Both Stymphalos and Akragas allowed the inhabitants of Elatea and Selinous, respectively, to dwell for a time among their citizens voluntarily.31 Insofar as one of these instances, that involving Akragas and Selinous, pre-dates the union of Latmos and Pidasa, it serves as a more preferable background to the offer of temporary housing in our text than third century documents. At the very least, both examples demonstrate the possibility that an offer of stathmoi could originate in the city in which the lodgings existed, especially when those being quartered were not soldiers.

Saba’s second argument – that voluntary sympoliteiai do not contain permanent housing clauses – depends on a consideration of three examples: the voluntary mergers between Smyrna and Magnesia on the Sipylos and between Miletos and Pidasa, and the forced synoikismos of Teos and Lebedos. She contrasts the hasty and relatively unregulated housing provisions on the former two agreements with the very detailed arrangements specified by Antigonos’ mandate for the Teians, observing quite rightly that only the latter case involved an en masse movement of the population that had to be enforced by a higher authority. She points out that no regulation was necessary in the two sympoliteiai because most of the population of the community being absorbed was not expected to emigrate to Smyrna and Miletos. Here local interests lie behind the housing provisions. The implication of her presentation is that the unregulated permission granted to the Pidaseans to build in the public sector of Latmos is evidence that local interests dictated this arrangement as well. It is therefore confusing when Saba concludes that Latmos, like Teos, was compelled to offer permanent housing to Pidaseans. Her reasoning, that Latmos would not gain defensively or territorially from the merger, involves an almost willful ignorance of the benefits that the Pidasean territory offered, benefits which she herself assumes in her discussion of Miletos’ absorption of the same Pidasa in the second century.32 As we have seen, the terms of its sympoliteia with Miletos prove that Pidasa’s resources included olive and wine production.33 By Saba’s own logic, then, the merger of Latmos and Pidasa resembles those sympoliteiai in which local interests factored most.

In light of this, I would like to propose an alternate interpretation of the housing clauses that considers them in the context of the “incentive” provisions in isopoliteia agreements. In certain

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29 The evidence is collected in Hennig, Chiron 25, 1995, 267–82, and consists of papyri dating from the reign of Ptolemy II, as well as inscriptions that attest Ptolemaic lodging of troops in Rhamnous and Antiochos III quartering his soldiers at Sardis.
30 Hennig, op. cit., 269–75. It is perhaps significant that no evidence exists for epistathmeia in Alexandria.
32 Compare “This sympoliteia appears to have had two main goals, increasing both the Milesian territory and the Pidasean security” (131) and “On the other hand ... Latmos did not acquire much from a defensive and territorial point of view from their sympoliteia agreements” (132).
33 See n. 25.
of these, privileges such as proedria and even ateleia are promised to whoever activates the politeia offered by the decreeing city.\textsuperscript{34} According to Wilfred Gawantka, such bestowals were motivated by a desire to amplify the citizenry of the granting city or to make the isopoliteia offer more than just a mere formality.\textsuperscript{35} Likewise, we should see in the injunction to provide housing for the Pidaseans, as well as the provision allowing Pidaseans to build houses in Latmos, the creation of only the opportunity to move to the larger city.\textsuperscript{36} This also makes better sense of the brief period of the housing offer: one year. This limitation implies that more Pidaseans could move to Latmos after one year, and that this possibility was undesirable to one or both parties. Were these clauses then a Latmian initiative to completely absorb Pidasa, albeit non-coercively, or a concession to a small community, some of whose citizens hoped to take advantage of opportunities that only existed at Latmos? The latter possibility seems more likely when one considers the donative nature of similar provisions in isopoliteia texts.

The clause in the agreement on marriage between Latmians and Pidasans has also not yet been fully understood. This remarkable stipulation seems to aim at creating a melding pot of the citizenry of both communities, erasing all feelings of self-identity.\textsuperscript{37} Yet would six years really accomplish this? The marriage rate in the United States was .75\% in 2005.\textsuperscript{38} In Japan, it was 1\% in 1970 and has been .6\% since the mid-1980s.\textsuperscript{39} Even if we double the highest of these figures and apply it to Pidasa and Latmos, to compensate for the de-normatization of marriage in modern societies, we still only get 12\% of the population involved in intermarriages during the six years prescribed.\textsuperscript{40} While these couples would constitute a sizeable minority, they would neither eliminate the self-identity of Pidasa nor habituate the two cities to continue the practice. What six years of intermarriage would achieve, however, is the formation and augmentation of good relations between the two cities.\textsuperscript{41} In fact, this is exactly what the text tells us: “in order that they make epigamiai”. This right to marry citizens from another city was often granted in the context of alliances, treaties, or other inter-state exchanges to promote good will.\textsuperscript{42} At the same time, the fact that the “privilege” was enforced reveals a more important aim. Since civic

\textsuperscript{34} This is especially true of the isopoliteiai in which Miletos was involved in the late third and early second centuries. Its citizens received proedria from Olbia, Seleukia/Tarallelis, and Mylasa, but only if they enrolled as citizens of the other city (\textit{Milet I.3}, nos. 136, 143, 146); in the treaty between Miletos and Herakleia on the Latmos, both cities grant ateleia to citizens of the other city who choose to move to theirs.

\textsuperscript{35} Gawantka (1975), 59–68.

\textsuperscript{36} Counter to the position of both Habicht and Jones, who assume that the housing would accommodate the entire population of Pidasa, based in turn on the assumption that the 390 beds stipulated in the sympoliteia between Miletos and Pidasa corresponded to the actual population of the latter in the early second century; Habicht (1998), 10 n. 15; Jones (1999), 4.

\textsuperscript{37} Reger (2004), 152.

\textsuperscript{38} National Center for Health Statistics, 2006.


\textsuperscript{40} Assuming that 2\% of the population married each year for six years. The adjustment I have made is probably excessive, since the 1\% figure is described as a “marriage boom” for Japan.

\textsuperscript{41} Not only through Latmian-Pidasean couples, but from the creation of a generation of children with this dual identity (cf. Alexander’s order for Macedonian-Iranian intermarriage among his officers). Cf. Bencivenni (2003), 162.

\textsuperscript{42} Rhodes, \textit{RE}, 1105; for epigamia in isopoliteiai, see Gawantka (1975), 30ff.
identity in ancient poleis was often predicated on the civic identity of both parents, it is very possible that the measure sought to enable incorporation of former “outsiders”, the Pidaseans, while still maintaining an overall principle of exclusivity. Yet to ensure that the practice was not only theoretically possible, but grounded in factual precedent, the two communities took the extreme step of making the practice mandatory. The clause may also have been concerned about regulating a Pidasean tendency to marry outside their civic body. In the second century, the Milesians made sure to limit their offer of citizenship to Pidasean women “from Pidasa or a Greek city”, suggesting that some Pidasean men had wives from other Greek (and non-Greek!) cities. If Pidasa was exogamous in the fourth century as well, the Latmians may have wished to channel this “external” search for brides into their own civic body, especially if they themselves adhered to the tenets of endogamy. We need not need look outside of Latmos and Pidasa to find motives for this extraordinary clause.

These considerations permit the modification of Pidasa’s expectations with respect to the sympoliteia. Rather than negotiating the best conditions for an inevitable incorporation from an overpowering neighbor, Pidasa seems to have been able to assert its interests and preserve the most important aspects of its communal identity. This creates the serious possibility that Pidasa entered the arrangement willingly. Among the potential aims that may have led this inland town to combine with Latmos, access to a port seems a strong candidate. Such access could have provided wider markets for Pidasean agricultural goods, about which we hear much more in its second century sympoliteia with Miletos. A harbor also entailed contact with the outside world of a non-economic nature. Although we lack any evidence that Latmos enjoyed relations with other states in the Aegean at this time, the city had dedicated statues at Didyma in the 6th century, paid as much tribute to Athens as Myous and Priene in the 5th century, and sent ambassadors to mediate a treaty between Mylasa and Kindya under Maussolos. It is at least possible, then, that the city’s prestige, and hence that of its leading citizens, was substantial enough to attract the attention of a smaller neighbor like Pidasa. The point should not be pressed. In addition, Latmos may have offered an improved place of refuge in the face of an invading or raiding army. Although the looming walls that still define the descendant of Latmos, Herakleia, had not been built yet, the anecdotes about both Mausollos and Artemisia needing ruses to take the city suggest a rather defensible site.

I have attempted to show how altering our assumptions about the context of the union of Latmos and Pidasa yields a very different understanding of the motives and aims of the arrangement. I have also argued for grounding these assumptions in the text of the agreement itself rather than in the familiar narratives of Hellenistic political history that focus on the ambitions of powerful individuals. While it would be foolish to presume that towns like Pidasa and Latmos were

45 See n. 14 above.
47 Polyainos 7.23.2, 8.53.4; cf. Pimouguet-Pédarros–Geny (2000), 264–270, 357–367. I find Wörler’s arguments (2003, 140–143; cf. O. Hilden, Pleistarchos und die Befestigungsanlagen von Herakleia am Latmos, Klio 82, 2000, 382–408) in favor of Asandros as the founder of the new site of Latmos/Herakleia unconvincing. The fact that the stone on which the sympoliteia was inscribed was discovered much closer to Herakleia does not prove that it was originally set up there, but only that it was likely moved there when the city was physically relocated closer to the gulf.
entirely unaffected by the Karian satrap Asandros, it is unnecessary to infer his direct involvement in every event of the local history of these poleis, especially when the text suggests that the merger came about through and for the communities involved. Moreover, the agreement attests to the interests not only of the larger partner, Latmos, who stood to gain in territory, resources, and population, but of Pidasa as well. In fact, the very terms often read as threatening the very existence of Pidasa – the housing and marriage clauses – are designed to promote involvement in the larger community of Latmos while at the same time preserving the institutions around which a more local, Pidasean, identity could continue to flourish. As such, the inscription documenting these terms and the merger that they define is an important piece of evidence for how Greek, or at least Greek-speaking, communities responded to the changing world around them in a very local way: acknowledging the power of the Hellenistic satrap but pursuing their own ends.

Works Cited